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The growth in the acquisition cycle time of large defense systems from what was 
planned (i.e., schedule growth) creates several issues for defense acquisition managers and 
policy makers.  These issues include increased likelihoods of cancellations, changes in 
requirements, and delays in the fielding of improved combat capabilities and replacements 
for legacy systems, which have resulted in further cost and schedule growth.  As a result, 
Congress, the DoD, and the individual military services implemented several major reforms 
to address the cost and schedule growth of weapon systems.   
This research presents an empirical model of schedule growth to evaluate the impact 
of acquisition reform efforts, defense budget changes, unexpected inflation, and major 
contingency operations (war) on schedule growth of major weapon systems.  A fixed-effects 
panel regression model was utilized to describe the schedule performance (using earned value 
data) of the major weapon system programs managed by the Army, Air Force, and Navy 
from 1980 to 2002.  This research found that unexpected inflation results in increased 
schedule growth.  In addition, the 2000 revision of the DoD 5000 series accounted for a 
reduction in schedule growth.  The other examined acquisition reforms—the Packard 
Commission of 1986 and the 1993-1996 reform efforts [e.g., the Federal Acquisition 
Streamlining Act of 1994 and the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996]—were not correlated with 
schedule growth.  This lack of a relationship suggests these reforms were not fully 
internalized into the Department of Defense’s acquisition process and appear to have not 
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In a recent study of 26 major Department of Defense (DoD) acquisition programs, 
the Government Accountability Office (GAO, 2006) found that the development costs of 
these programs increased by 37 percent and the acquisition cycle time increased by 17 
percent.  This growth in the cost and acquisition cycle time (schedule) of large defense 
systems creates several issues for defense acquisition managers and policy makers.  Due 
to limited budgets, cost overruns lead to potential reductions in weapon system quantities 
and capabilities and increased budget instability in other programs where funds are taken 
in order to pay for the overruns (Czelusniak and Rogers, 1997:62).  Similar issues arise 
due to schedule growth, including an increased likelihood of cancellation due to 
escalating costs and schedule delays (Pinto and Mantel, 1990:273).  Additionally, a 
longer development schedule allows more opportunities to change (and add to) the 
technical requirements for the weapon system (Drezner and Smith, 1990:1).  In the 
circumstances regarding a replacement weapon system, a growth in the schedule of this 
system also extends the planned life of the existing system(s) assuming there is a desire 
to maintain that war fighting capability (Reinertsen et al., 2002:8).  As a result, additional 
operations and support costs are required to maintain the existing system or systems until 








Congress, the DoD, and the individual military services implemented several 
major corporate reforms to address the cost and schedule growth of weapon systems 
(Hanks et al., 2005:xiv).  These reforms usually involved the removal of time-consuming 
and costly requirements of the defense procurement process (Hanks et al., 2005:xiv).  
These major corporate reforms paved the way for and institutionalized numerous 
operational level actions to address one or more of the factors contributing to cost and 
schedule growth (Hanks et al, 2005:38).  This research focuses on analyzing the schedule 
growth aspect.  
Several researchers focused on identifying the numerous factors contributing to 
schedule growth that are addressed by the operational level actions of the acquisition 
reforms.  These factors include technical risk (Cashman, 1995; Rodrigues, 2000), 
requirements stability (Dawkins, 1987; McNutt, 1998) and planned schedule duration 
(Drezner and Smith, 1990; McNutt, 1998).  Other researchers evaluated the management 
initiatives implemented to address these factors of schedule growth, including 
prototyping (Tyson et al., 1992), incentive contracts (Tyson et al., 1992), and 
evolutionary acquisition (GAO, 2006).  Other studies suggested cost and schedule growth 
of acquisition programs can be contributed to additional factors that are primarily 
external to the acquisition process.  These factors include budget instability (McNutt, 
1998), contingency operations (McNutt, 1998; Czelusniak and Rogers, 1997), and 









While researchers (Christensen et al., 1998; Holbrook, 2003; Smirnoff, 2006) 
have assessed the impact of acquisition reforms on cost growth, there has yet to be an 
empirically rigorous study on the impact of reform efforts on schedule growth.  
Accordingly, the primary purpose of this research is to evaluate the effectiveness of 
acquisition reform efforts on limiting schedule growth of major DoD weapon systems.  In 
order to isolate the influences of reforms, this research addresses the extent to which 
factors external to the acquisition process are related to schedule growth, specifically 
defense budget changes (budget instability), unexpected inflation, and major contingency 
operations.   
Scope & Methodology 
To complete this research, data was collected from the Defense Acquisition 
Executive Summary (DAES) reports, which include programmatic and earned value data 
for the major acquisition programs for all of the services.  More specifically, details 
pertaining to the schedule information of the various defense acquisition efforts and 
calculations of schedule growth were collected and analyzed.  Currently, program 
initiation is marked by the entrance into the system development phase (GAO, 2006:6).  
Consistent with previous research, these major defense acquisition reforms are modeled 
as dummy variables (c.f., Smirnoff, 2006) reflecting (and beginning in) the year in which 
the reforms in the revisions to the DoD 5000 series of regulations reflecting the DoD’s 
policy on defense acquisition.1  The impact of the major defense acquisition reforms and 
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1 Additional information, including rationale regarding the operationalizations utilized in this research, is 
provided in Chapter III.   
 
the previously identified external factors on schedule growth are evaluated using panel 

























II. Literature Review 
 
This chapter examines the literature regarding schedule growth of Department of 
Defense (DoD) weapon systems.  This chapter begins by describing the principal factors 
contributing to schedule growth.  This section includes an exploration of several 
management initiatives implemented by the DoD to mitigate the risk and impact of many 
of these factors on a program’s success.  Then, this chapter describes several efforts 
initiated by the DoD and Congress to reform weapon system acquisition.  This section 
also includes a review of the research analyzing the effectiveness of the reform efforts.   
Acquisition Reform  
As a result of the cost and schedule growth of weapon systems, Congress and the 
DoD introduced several reforms to improve the efficiency and responsiveness of the 
defense acquisition process (including the laws, regulations, and training) (Hanks et al., 
2005:xiv).  These reforms traditionally involved streamlining requirements, speeding up 
processes, reducing overhead, and cutting paperwork in order to reduce the bureaucracy 
of defense procurement (Hanks et al., 2005:xiv).  These large scale corporate reforms 
translated into numerous operational level actions to address one or more of the factors 
contributing to cost and schedule growth (Hanks et al, 2005:38).  The following section 
examines these factors and several management initiatives (i.e. the operation level 
actions) to mitigate the risk and impact of these factors.  An exploration of key 
acquisition reform efforts follows, which includes a discussion of the recommendations, 
mandated changes, and the research concerning the effectiveness of these corporate 
reform efforts.   
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Factors Affecting Schedule Growth  
While not as plentiful as the research on cost growth, there have been several 
studies regarding the factors affecting schedule growth.2  While there are myriad 
potential factors contributing to schedule growth, it is beyond the scope of this research 
to address all of these factors.3  Nonetheless, several key factors identified in the existing 
literature are discussed, including technical risk, requirement changes, and planned 
schedule duration.   
 
Technical Risk  
 Technical risk refers to both the maturity of the technology being incorporated 
into the weapon system and the technical complexity of the system’s design (Cashman, 
1995:73).  The level of technical risk increases when the technology is less mature and 
when the design is more complex.  This greater technical risk often corresponds with a 
greater probability and a greater number of technical problems encountered in the design 
and development of the components and systems (Cashman, 1995:74).  As a result of the 
rework to address the technical issues, the programs experience schedule and cost growth 
(Drezner and Smith, 1990:23).   
A study by Dawkins (1987) conveyed similar results regarding the influence of 
technical risk on schedule delays.  Studying delays on forty-eight general building 
(instructional facilities, laboratories, aircraft hangars, office buildings, addition projects, 
                                                 
2 Most of the factors affecting schedule growth also contribute to cost growth, including requirements 
changes (Drezner et al., 1993), budget instability (Singleton, 1991), technical risk (Drezner et al., 1993), 
contingency operations (Czelusniak and Rogers, 1997), and planned schedule duration (Jarvaise et al., 
1996).  This chapter alludes to this relationship on several occasions.   
3 See Drezner and Smith (1990), Cashman (1995), and Monaco (2005) for an analysis of these additional 




and warehouse facilities) construction contracts, Dawkins found technical difficulty in 
the design as the most significant factor for the delays of the construction projects 
(1987:66,69).  The DoD’s traditional strategy for acquiring major weapon systems has 
been to plan programs that would achieve a big leap forward in capability. This suggests 
that there is some inherent technical risk in most DoD weapon system programs because 
the needed technologies often are immature, where programs stay in development for 
years until the technologies are demonstrated (GAO, 2003:3).  Rodrigues (2000:10) 
found that those programs allowed to advance further into system development despite 
low levels of technical maturity and unproven technologies suffered the effects of this 
high technical risk with increased costs and schedule slips.  
 
Requirement Changes 
 Requirement changes include increases or decreases in the specific capabilities of 
the system to be produced.  These desired capabilities may change as a result of 
availability of a newer technology or changing circumstances, such as programmatic 
difficulties, availability of resources, and management direction.  The inability to meet 
cost, schedule, or technical performance requirements often forces the acquisition 
program to suspend requirements, increase funding, or to delay the product (McNutt, 
1998:102).  For large DoD acquisition projects, if these changes concern the acquisition 
program baseline requirements, the schedule delay is exacerbated by the requirement to 
go through a similar level of review as the original milestone decision process (McNutt, 
1998:102). 
While not as influential as technical difficulty, Dawkins found that changes by the 
owner did influence delays of the construction projects significantly (1987:66,69).  These 
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owner changes are analogous to the requirement changes in DoD acquisition programs.  
McNutt (1998:276) found similar results regarding the relative impact of requirement 
changes on schedule slips.  In a survey of 175 projects, requirement changes ranked third 
behind funding instability and technical problems as the reason for a development 
program to slip—accounting for approximately one quarter of the total average project 
slip of approximately two months per year (McNutt, 1998:276).   
 
Planned Schedule Duration  
A program with a longer development schedule has a greater probability of a 
schedule delaying event occurring, such as budget changes (McNutt, 1998), technical 
problems (Drezner and Smith, 1990), cost overruns (Jarvaise et al., 1996), and 
requirement changes (Drezner and Smith, 1990).   
A study by Monaco, however, had conflicting results regarding the relationship 
between program duration and schedule growth (2005:76).  He found the likelihood and 
magnitude of a schedule slip decreases as the development duration increases.  The 
speculated rationale was there were greater opportunities to adjust to a problem in the 
program when the program had a longer planned development schedule (Monaco, 
2005:106).  Unlike the previous studies of schedule growth, Monaco restricted the 
analysis to more recent development programs (1990-2003) that were at least three years 








Several management initiatives were instituted to mitigate the risk and impact 
these factors have on program success, specifically in terms of cost and schedule.  The 
major acquisition reforms (described in greater detail below) institutionalized many of 
these management initiative as a part of their efforts to reduced cost and schedule growth.  
Many initiatives still remain in some form from their creation; whereas others faded away 
in favor of different management initiatives.  For example, after 1965, the total package 
procurement (TPP) concept was utilized to reduce the cost risks born by the government 
by having contractors bid on the development, production, and support work under one 
fixed-price contract.  TPP was intended to discourage the practice of contractors 
submitting low bids for development (in a competition) and then profiting under sole-
source production contracts.  During the early 1970s, however, a number of TPP 
programs had large cost overruns, which left some contractors in need of Government 
assistance (Tyson et al., 1992:II-2). Similar experiences occurred regarding fixed-price 
development contracts (Tyson et al., 1992:X-8).  As a result, total package procurement 
was discontinued in favor of cost-plus-incentive-fee contracts that placed more risk on 
the government (Tyson et al., 1992:II-2).   
These incentive contracts were designed to motivate the contractor to meet 
desired acquisition objectives while discouraging inefficiency and waste (FAR 16.401a).  
Incentive contracts usually include cost objectives, but can also include incentives for 
technical or schedule-related performance (FAR 16.401b).  Tyson found development 
programs with incentive contracts experienced less schedule growth than those programs 
without incentive contracts (i.e. fixed-fee contracts) (Tyson et al., 1992:VI-3).   
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Another manner in which the government attempts to manage the risks of 
program is through the use of prototyping.  Prototyping is designed to reduce technical 
risk by building and testing detailed pieces of hardware prior to any large-scale 
development (Tyson et al., 1992:V-1).  These working models are used to demonstrate a 
concept, a specific design, or an operational objective.  In order to reduce the potential for 
issues in development, potential design problems need to be identified and resolved as 
early as possible (Tyson et al., 1992:V-2).  In an analysis of tactical aircraft and 
munitions from the 1960s to 1989, Tyson found no statistical difference between the 
development schedule growth of programs that were prototyped and those that were not 
(Tyson et al., 1992:V-3).  Overall, prototyped programs took somewhat longer, but the 
differences may be due to technical complexity (Tyson et al., 1992:ES-5).  
Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations (ACTD) and Advanced 
Technology Demonstrations (ATD) are prototype efforts that are instrumental in the 
initiatives to reduce the acquisition cycle time of weapon systems.  These experimental 
tools generated a second parallel acquisition process, which give war fighters the 
opportunity to assess prototype operational capability prior to formal program initiation 
(system development). The objective was to bridge the gap and improve the transition of 
Science and Technology (S&T) projects into the formal acquisition process (Vollmecke, 
2004:7).  As part of technology development, ACTDs and ATDs aim to increase the level 
of technical maturity of a technology prior to implementation into a weapon system.  
The evolutionary acquisition approach relies upon the availability of mature 
technologies to field an operationally useful and supportable capability in as short a time 
as possible with the intent to deliver additional capability in the future (Sylvester and 
Ferrara; 2003:5-6).  Evolutionary acquisition stresses an incremental approach to 
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development, which capitalizes on the best mature technologies available at a given point 
in time.  Evolutionary acquisition takes advantage of concurrent engineering and reduces 
acquisition cycle time by minimizing technical uncertainty at the start of the development 
program (Sylvester and Ferrara; 2003:8).  The GAO identified this strategy of maturing a 
new technology to a high level of technology readiness prior to inclusion in a product as a 
commercial industry best practice and a major determinant of the success of new product 
launches (Best-Practices, 1999:3).   
Evolutionary acquisition is a major shift from the single-step-to-full-capability 
acquisition strategy (grand design approach) used extensively for the past 30 years 
(Sylvester and Ferrara; 2003:8).  The single-step-to-full-capability strategy involves an 
identified end state in terms of capability requirements, which the program would attain 
in one (usually lengthy) increment (Sylvester and Ferrara; 2003:8).  Not surprisingly, in a 
2006 study, the GAO contended the DoD was not effectively implementing the 
evolutionary approach by continuing to accept high levels of technology risk for 
programs entering into system design and development (GAO, 2006:12).  Since 2000, 
thirteen of the eighteen programs initiated under the revised acquisition policy received 
approval to enter system development with immature technologies (GAO, 2006:14).   
Key Acquisition Reform Efforts 
 This section discusses the following acquisition reforms and their potential impact 
on schedule execution: the Packard Commission (1986), the National Performance 
Review (1993) and Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994, and the revision of the 
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DoD 5000 series in 2000.4  These reforms serve as the basis for this research into the 
influence of acquisition reforms on schedule growth.  In addition, the literature suggests 
the selected acquisition reforms were singular in their scope and potential impact on 
schedule execution.  While additional reforms have been implemented that may have also 
impacted schedule growth, an analysis of these reforms is beyond the scope of this 
study.5  The following section provides details regarding these reform efforts, including 
the recommendations and initiatives of these reforms, the implementation of these 
initiatives and recommendations, and studies evaluating the efficacy of these initiatives.   
 
Packard Commission (1986) 
In July 1985, President Reagan instituted the Blue Ribbon Commission on 
Defense Management (also known as the Packard Commission) to investigate issues 
pertaining to defense management and organization (Blue Ribbon Commission, 
1986:27).  In order to address the horror stories in the media of excessive prices for parts, 
test failures, and cost and schedule overruns, a task force was created to specifically 
address the military acquisition process (Munechika, 1997:12).  In order to improve the 
defense acquisition system, which included improving cost and schedule performance by 
limiting overruns and reducing acquisition cycle time, the task force established a 
formula for action for the DoD to implement (Blue Ribbon Commission, 1986:15).  The 
commission recommended stabilizing the programs, balancing cost and performance, 
using technology to reduce cost, streamlining acquisition organization and procedures, 
                                                 
4 Due to restrictions in the data obtained for this analysis (from 1980-2002), the revision of the DoD 5000 
series in 2003 was excluded from this list of key acquisition reforms.   
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5 For additional information on other acquisition reform efforts, see Reig (2000), Munechika (1997), 
Ferrara (1996), and Vollmecke (2004).   
 
expanding the use of commercial products, increasing competition, and raising the 
quality of acquisition personnel (Blue Ribbon Commission, 1986:52-71). 
Congress responded very enthusiastically to the Packard recommendations and, in 
short order, enacted the Defense Acquisition Improvement Act of 1986 (Ferrara, 
1996:120).  In addition, the DoD 5000 series was updated in 1987 to include the Packard 
Commission recommendations, including the new streamlined acquisition chain of 
command (Ferrara, 1996:120). 
A study by McNutt (1998) assessed the impact of the Packard Commission’s 
recommendations on schedule execution.  Despite implementation by the DoD, he 
contended the recommendations on schedule execution were not widely internalized and 
appeared to have been unsuccessful (McNutt, 1998:50).  His assessment relied on a 
visual analysis of the programmatic schedule data and interviews with government and 
contractor personnel in the Pentagon, program offices, and contractor facilities.  A more 
empirical analysis is needed to confirm this assessment of the Packard Commission’s 
impact on schedule performance.   
Searle (1997), Christensen et al. (1999), and Smirnoff (2006) analyzed the impact 
of the Packard Commission recommendations on cost growth.  The findings were 
inconsistent.  Christensen et al. (1999:257) found that cost performance of defense 
contracts worsened in the period following the commission.  In contrast, Smirnoff 
(2006:78) more recently concluded that cost performance improved as a result of the 
Packard Commission’s recommendations.  These inconsistent results might be attributed 
to the methods that were used to analyze the issue.  Due to the size and complexity of the 
Department of Defense, a large acquisition reform effort would likely take some time to 
implement (Reig, 2000:38).  In order to address this issue, one method has been for the 
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researcher to identify a treatment date of when they considered reform efforts to be fully 
institutionalized in the DoD.  Unfortunately, the researcher cannot be certain that this 
point in time accurately reflects when a reform is fully implemented.  Searle (1997) and 
Christensen et al. (1999) used December 31, 1991 as a subjective treatment date for 
separating the data into pre- and post-reform.  That is, this date represented their 
assessment of when the Packard recommendations were fully institutionalized in the 
DoD.  They utilized statistical tests of the difference between population means of the 
two periods to assess the efficacy of the Packard Commission (Searle, 1997:65).   
Even if there were no uncertainty around a treatment date, the principal concern 
with their studies is the absence of external (control) variables, such as changes in 
defense budgets, inflation, or war, might have biased the results of these studies 
(Smirnoff, 2006:20).  Christensen et al. identified this bias as a potential threat to the 
internal validity of their study (1999:262).  That is, these acquisition reform efforts might 
have resulted in less cost growth, but this relationship could be observed using their 
method due to the influence of external, environmental factors.   
In order to address the shortcomings of the previous studies, Smirnoff (2006) 
utilized panel regression to evaluate the impact of acquisition reform efforts and several 
environmental variables on cost growth. The use of panel regression allowed for a more 
robust analysis of these factors compared to the use of subjective treatment dates and 
statistical tests of the difference between two means, because it showed the relative 
importance of each variable and its contribution to cost growth in a dynamic situation 
(Smirnoff, 2006:5).  Additionally, Smirnoff used the panel regression results to 
statistically determine the lag structure (i.e. treatment dates) for the implementation of the 
acquisition reform efforts instead of developing a subjective treatment date.  Because the 
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reform efforts address many of the common factors of both cost and schedule growth, an 
empirical evaluation of schedule growth utilizing a method similar to Smirnoff (2006) 
may yield similar results after controlling for external factors.  Specifically, whether the 
implementation of the acquisition reforms stemming from the Packard Commission 
reduced schedule growth. 
 
1993-1996 Reform Efforts 
 Initiated in March 1993 and led by then-Vice President Gore, the National 
Performance Review (NPR) performed a detailed look at all government activities to find 
areas for improvement (GAO-NPR, 1999:3). The initial NPR report contained 384 
recommendations spanning all aspects of government operations, including federal 
procurement.  The report identified the need for the DoD to eliminate regulatory burden, 
simplify procurement, and rely more on the commercial market (Rogers and 
Birmingham, 2004:39).   
 The Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994 (FASA) codified many of the 
NPR’s recommendations.  The FASA was devised to overhaul the cumbersome and 
complex procurement system of the federal government. To this end, the act significantly 
modified or eliminated over 225 existing statutes (Holbrook, 2003:17-18).  The 
overarching themes of the FASA included a preference for moving to commercial 
contracting methods, transitioning the procurement process to an electronic basis, 
eliminating non value-added requirements, and eliminating paperwork burdens in the 
procurement cycle (Cooper, 2002:16).  The Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996 further advanced 
the changes made by FASA, providing additional opportunities for the DoD to further 
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streamline and reduce non-value added steps in the acquisition process (Holbrook, 
2003:19).   
The National Performance Review (1993), the FASA (1994), and Clinger-Cohen 
Act (1996) led to a wave of acquisition management initiatives, including variations of 
the previously mentioned management initiatives (e.g. evolutionary acquisition, program 
stability, advanced concept technology demonstration).  Hanks et al. (2005:38) identified 
46 such initiatives that were initiated between 1994 and 1996.  In their examination of 
these acquisition management initiatives, Hanks et al. grouped these reform initiatives 
into five themes:  
 - Rationalizing and improving the industrial base    
 - Streamlining 
 - Civilian-military integration 
 - Logistics transformation and total life-cycle system management 
 - Reducing fraud, waste, and abuse (Hanks et al., 2005:122-124) 
 
More than half of these acquisition management initiatives focused on ways to streamline 
the acquisition process, which often meant relaxing some of the controls established in 
the 1980s to guard against fraud, waste, and abuse (Hanks et al., 2005:16).   
Most of these initiatives were instituted in the 1996 revision of the DoD 5000 
series. The 1996 version reflected how the acquisition system responded to the changing 
global environment since the end of the Cold War.  Due to the uncertainty of where and 
when threats to the United States could come, the acquisition system needed the 
flexibility to be able to respond very quickly (Ferrara, 1996:123).  The 1996 version 
instituted Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations in order to infuse new 
technology into the process (Ferrara, 1996:123).  
Integrated Product Teams (IPTs) were also institutionalized under this revision.  
The purpose of IPTs was to breakdown the barriers between different organizations and 
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acquisition disciplines and to encourage integrated solutions to management problems 
(Ferrara, 1996:123).  The 1996 revisions also added the management concept of cost as 
an independent variable, which involves making cost more of a constraint and less of a 
variable.  As a result, tradeoffs were made between performance requirements and life-
cycle costs in order to meet cost objectives (Hanks et al., 2005:92).  Additionally, the 
revision included strategies to reduce expensive testing, in terms of time and money, 
through the use of modeling and simulation. Finally, the 1996 revision significantly 
reduced the amount of paperwork as compared to the previous (1991) version by 
canceling numerous previously mandated report formats (Ferrara, 1996:127). 
 Similar to the studies of the effectiveness of the Packard Commission’s 
recommendation, studies on the impact of the 1993-1996 reform efforts yielded 
conflicting results.  The National Performance Review (NPR) claimed its efforts to 
reinvent the government generated $137 billion in savings between 1993 and 2000 
(GAO-NPR, 1999:1).  A study by the GAO contended this number was exaggerated, 
because the NPR figure took credit for all of an agency’s savings (compared to a 
baseline) over that time period, even the savings resulting from separate reform initiatives 
that were consistent with the NPR principles of reinventing government (GAO-NPR, 
1999:1-2).  Due to the complexity and time required, the GAO did not calculate the 
actual savings that were solely attributable to the NPR recommendations (GAO-NPR, 
1999:1).  These studies did not assess the impact of the NPR recommendations on 
schedule growth. 
Smirnoff found the passing of the FASA corresponded with reduced cost growth 
regardless of contract type (2006:73).  Holbrook contended the FASA and the Clinger-
Cohen Act did not have an impact on cost growth; however, he utilized a subjective 
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treatment date of December 31, 1997, for his analysis and did not control for the potential 
influence of any external factors (2003:91).  As a result, his study suffers from the same 
limitations as those found in the studies by Searle (1997) and Christensen et al. (1999) on 
the impact of the Packard Commission recommendations on cost growth.  
 As a result of the focus by researchers on cost growth--specifically the 
effectiveness of DoD policies and reform initiatives on controlling cost growth--there has 
yet to be a study assessing the impact of the NPR, FASA, or the Clinger-Cohen Act on 
schedule growth.  Many of these acquisition reform initiatives were aimed at addressing 
the underlying causes of cost and schedule growth, such as reducing the technical risk 
and ensuring requirements stability, that add unplanned work to the development effort.  
As a result, an empirical analysis of the impact of these acquisition reform efforts on 
schedule growth may produce results consistent with the studies concerning cost growth.  
 
DoD 5000 Revision (2000) 
The 2000 revision codified many of the initiatives that were developed under the 
wave of acquisition reform efforts in the mid-to-late 1990s but not yet integrated into the 
DoD 5000 series.  One of the more significant initiatives, in terms of its potential 
influence (assuming proper implementation) on schedule performance, was evolutionary 
acquisition.  The 2000 revision made evolutionary acquisition the preferred DoD strategy 
for rapid acquisition of mature technology for the user (Hawthorne, 2003:np).   
 Due to the relatively recent focus on evolutionary acquisition and challenges in 
implementing the strategy (GAO, 2006), there has yet to be an empirical evaluation of the 
impact of evolutionary approaches on DoD weapon systems acquisition.  However, the 
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success of commercial efforts using a similar approach suggests evolutionary acquisition, 
when properly implemented, may provide its theoretical benefits (GAO, 2006:1).6
External Factors (Control Variables) 
In addition, the existing literature suggests several factors that are primarily 
external to the defense acquisition process. In order to alleviate the omitted variable 
issues in the previous studies of acquisition reforms and cost growth, external factors are 
included as control variables in this research of the efficacy of acquisition reform efforts 
to limit schedule growth.  The following section details the external factors affecting 
schedule growth and the corresponding research of these factors.   
 
Budget Instability 
A program’s requirements are often modified as a result of adjustments to the 
program’s budgets (current and projected) (McNutt, 1998:188).  The schedule of planned 
work to be performed on a program assumes a certain amount of funding across 
numerous years.  When this funding is altered, the program is faced with a decision to 
reduce requirements or to obtain additional funding in another (typically later) year and 
stretch out the program.  Technical performance requirements, however, are less likely to 
be changed than the length of the schedule (McNutt, 1998:188).  In a 1998 survey of 205 
personnel at the Pentagon and various program offices, 113 stated that the schedule was 
more likely to change than performance requirements; whereas, only 46 stated 
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6 On October 30, 2002, a memorandum issued by Paul Wolfowitz, the then-Undersecretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, cancelled the current DoD 5000 series of regulations (Rogers and 
Birmingham, 2004:46).  An interim guidance was put in place until the revised DoD 5000 series was issued 
in 2003, which is the current version.  Several of the key initiatives implemented in the 2000 revision 
remained, specifically evolutionary acquisition.  
 
performance requirements would more likely change—a statistically significant 
difference (McNutt, 1998:287-288).  A similar statistically significant difference existed 
in the tradeoff of cost and schedule where the schedule was more likely to be extended 
(McNutt, 1998:288).   
In addition, McNutt (1998:276) surveyed government and contractor personnel at 
the Pentagon, program offices, and contractor facilities representing 175 projects.  
Results indicated that funding instability was the primary reason for a development 
program to slip—accounting for one month of the total average project slip of 
approximately two months per year (McNutt, 1998:276).  Although there were some 
limitations with McNutt’s method (i.e., it was a retrospective look that could be 
influenced by errors in recall), the individuals that were surveyed were closer to the 
projects than outsiders.  Additionally, the individuals involved in the study were those 
that would be updating higher headquarters and Congress on the program’s status. 
 
Contingency Operations  
 Existing research has conflicting results concerning the influence of contingency 
operations on schedule growth, depending on the immediacy of the need for the weapon 
system.  One side suggests the needs of contingency operations require systems, 
especially those in or near production, to be fielded sooner so that the capability is 
available to the war fighters (McNutt, 1998:40).  As a result, those weapon systems 
identified as requirements for contingency operations are expected to have less (or 
negative—fielded prior to original plan) schedule growth. 
The other side addresses those programs not specifically required or hastened due 
to contingency operations.  Czelusniak and Rodgers found that Congressional decisions 
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to shift funds to near-term priorities external to these programs (e.g. unplanned 
contingency operations) accounted for up to one-half of the cost growth in major 
weapons systems (1997:59).  Their analysis, however, did not extend into the effects on 
schedule growth.  The expectation is that the funding needs related to contingency 
operations (including the accelerated programs) contribute to budget instability in the 
programs not identified as contingency requirements.  This budget instability leads to 
schedule growth as previously discussed.  Therefore, the analysis of the influence of 
budget instability on schedule growth would necessitate accounting for the instability 
resulting from contingency operations. 
 
Unexpected Inflation 
 Cost estimates for major programs span the entire life cycle of the program from 
initiation to disposal, which can last for numerous decades into the future.  The 
development phase of these programs alone spans numerous years.  These cost estimates 
included an estimate of inflation provided by the OSD Comptroller.  If inflation is 
unexpectedly high in a given year then that forecasting error could contribute to cost 
overruns.  There has yet to be an analysis of the impact of unexpected inflation on 
schedule growth; however, an analysis has been performed concerning cost growth.   
A study by Smirnoff (2006:64) did not find a statistically significant relationship 
between unexpected inflation and cost overruns of procurement or development 
contracts.  Additionally, the lack of a relationship between unexpected inflation and cost 
overruns may be due to the tradeoffs of reduced performance requirements or extended 






This chapter examined the principal factors affecting schedule growth of 
Department of Defense (DoD) weapon systems.  This chapter reviewed the major 
acquisition reforms with the scope and potential to impact schedule execution of defense 
acquisition efforts, which included a review of the research that assessed the efficacy of 
these reforms.  Additionally, the literature identified funding instability, unexpected 
inflation, and contingency operations as external factors potentially contributing to 
schedule growth.  This research on the efficacy of acquisition, however, has primarily 
been focused on cost growth.  This research provides the lacking empirical analysis of the 










III. Data and Methods 
 
This chapter details the methods used in this research, including a discussion of 
the operationalization of variables, the data analyzed, and the analytical techniques 
utilized in order to address the purpose of this research.  More specifically, this chapter 
discusses the empirical model that was developed, and data that was collected, to 
evaluate the efficacy of acquisition reform efforts on limiting schedule growth of major 
DoD weapon systems.  This model also addresses the influence of factors external to the 
acquisition process on schedule growth, including changes in defense budgets, 
unexpected inflation, and contingency operations.   
The relationships between the dependent variable (schedule growth of DoD 
weapon systems) and the independent variables (acquisition reforms, contingency 
operations, unexpected inflation rates, and budget changes) is evaluated using panel 
regression.  In addition to the discussion of the variables and the corresponding data, this 
chapter discusses the advantages of the use of panel regression in cross-sectional time-
series analysis.  
Programs 
 This research evaluates the schedule growth of major defense acquisition 
programs (MDAPs) that are categorized as acquisition category (ACAT) I programs.  
These programs are designated as ACAT I programs due to their estimated cost 
exceeding a threshold or due to special interests (by the DoD or Congress) in the program 
(DoD5000.2, 2003:np).  This cost threshold is currently $355 million in fiscal year (FY) 
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1996 constant year dollars for system development or $2.135 billion in FY 1996 constant 
dollars for production (DoD5000.2, 2003:np).  That is, if the estimated expenditures for 
the program exceed either of those thresholds, the acquisition program is considered an 
MDAP and categorized by the milestone decision authority as an ACAT I program.  
Highly sensitive, classified programs (as determined by the Secretary of Defense) are not 
included among the MDAPs due to their sensitive nature (DoD5000.2, 2003:np).  These 
programs receive special designations and are reported separately.  As a result, this 
research excludes classified programs from the analysis and concentrates on the ACAT I 
major defense acquisition programs.  Each of the military services is represented among 
the major defense acquisition programs.  Among these MDAPs are joint programs, which 
are designated by the lead service for the joint program, such as the Air Force being the 
lead service for the Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM) program.  
 As a result of being designated an ACAT I major defense acquisition program, 
these programs are required to submit quarterly submissions of the program’s status into 
the Defense Acquisition Executive Summary (DAES) database.  The DAES database 
includes Earned Value Management (EVM) data based on information supplied to the 
government by the performing contractor.  EVM allows the government and contractors to 
monitor the status of programs with regard to contract costs and schedule by comparing the 
actual cost for work performed, the budgeted cost for work performed, and the budgeted cost 
for work scheduled.  Due to the validation of the EVM accounting systems by the 
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government, the data produced by these systems is considered to be valid (Searle, 1997:42).  
The period of analysis utilized in this research is from 1980 to 2002.7  
This resulting sample DAES database is separated based on service and phase of 
the program—research and development (R&D) or procurement (proc.).  The number of 
entries corresponding to a specific contract’s EVM data is presented in the table below. 
An excerpt from the DAES database, a list of programs, and the number of contract 
entries per program is provided in Appendix A. 
Table 1:  Number of Contract Entries in Sample DAES Database 
Air Force Army Navy Total
R&D - Contract Entries 1,998 1,194 1,303 4,495
Proc. - Contract Entries 2,172 792 2,893 5,857  
 
Measures 
Outcome (Dependent Variable) 
Schedule Growth 
For the purposes of this research, schedule growth is defined and measured using 
a modified version of percent schedule variance based on the Earned Value Management 
Gold Card (2007).8  The following formula is used to calculate these values for 
percentage schedule growth of both development and production contracts: 
         
                                                 
7 This research utilizes the DAES database utilized in Smirnoff (2006), which extended from 1970 to 2002.  This 
database, however, did not include data for one of the dependent variables (unexpected inflation) prior to 1980 
due to the unavailability of inflation estimates.  In order to mitigate any potential confusion with a discussion of 
varying beginning dates, this research focuses all discussions/graphical presentations on the time period from 
1980 to 2002.   
8 The actual calculation for schedule variance according the EVM Gold Card is BCWP-BCWS, which results in 
negative values reflecting undesired circumstances.  In this research, the variables were switched to allow for 
positive values to reflect percent schedule variance (also referred to as schedule growth throughout this study).  
This adjustment allows for easier interpretation and analysis of the empirical model coefficients. 
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∑  (1) 
       
where:  BCWS = Budgeted Cost for Work Scheduled 
   BCWP = Budgeted Cost for Work Performed 
 
This equation aggregates the values by year, service, and program phase for all of the 
DAES contracts entries/years from 1980-2002.  The next chapter presents a visual 
representation of the schedule growth for both development and production contracts. 
A potential limitation of this operationalization of schedule growth is that it does 
not decipher between legitimate delays caused by DoD decisions, such as changing 
requirements, and delays caused by contractor performance.  The majority of the delays, 
however, cannot be attributed to contractor actions, such as when the DoD calls for 
performance requirements that represent a high technical risk or when the government 
(either Congress or the DoD) chooses to shift financial resources creating funding 
instability (Drezner and Smith, 1990:35; McNutt, 1998:275).  Despite the source of the 
delay, the issues resulting from schedule growth remain, including an increased 
probability of cancellation (Pinto and Mantel, 1990:273) and costs associated with 
maintaining existing systems (Reinertsen et al., 2002:8).   
Antecedents (Independent Variables) 
Acquisition Reform 
The acquisition reforms that are studied in this research include the Packard 
Commission, the 1993-1996 reforms (NPR, FASA, and the Clinger-Cohen Act), and the 
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2000 revision of the DoD 5000 series of regulations.  In accordance with previous 
research, these reforms are coded as dummy variables with a “1” indicating the presence 
of the reform (Smirnoff, 2006:28-29).  This research utilizes the year in which the DoD 
revised its DoD 5000 series of regulations as the first year of the presence of these 
reforms.  A common thread throughout the selected reforms is that the DoD 5000 series 
was revised soon after these acquisition reform efforts were codified (e.g., the Clinger-
Cohen Act) or the study recommendations published (e.g., the Packard Commission).  
These revisions point to changes in acquisition policy made by the DoD as a result of 
these major reform efforts, which would affect all of the current programs including the 
major defense acquisition programs.   
In accordance with this coding scheme, the Packard Commission 
recommendations are coded as “1” from 1987 to 1995.  The 1987 date reflects when the 
DoD revised its acquisition policy (DoD 5000 series) to incorporate the 
recommendations.  The 1993-1996 reforms and corresponding management initiatives 
were integrated into the 1996 revision of the DoD 5000 series; as a result, these reforms 
are coded as “1” from 1996 to 2002.  In addition, these reforms superseded many of 
reform initiatives/recommendations of the Packard Commission, which is why the 
Packard Commission ends at 1995.  Finally, the 2000 revision of the DoD 5000 series is 





External Factors  
Budget Instability 
This research utilized the actual procurement and development budgets as a proxy 
measure for budget instability.  Budget instability was measured by utilizing the constant 
year budget figures detailed in Chapter 6 of the National Defense Budget Estimates for 
2006 (also known as the FY2006 Greenbook).  The budget information in this report was 
collected for each service (Air Force, Army, Navy), for each appropriation (research and 
development and procurement), and for each year of the analysis (1980-2002).  A visual 
representation of the resulting values is presented in Appendix B. 
 
Contingency Operations  
This research codes contingency operations as a binary (dummy) variable, in 
which the values of “1” correspond to the existence of major combat operations (war) in 
a given year to account for the influence of the contingency operations on schedule 
growth of major defense acquisition programs.  These major combat operations are more 
likely to impact major defense acquisition programs, either through budget instability as 
suggested by Czelusniak and Rogers (1997) or through the needs of combatant 
commanders hastening programs in order to support the contingency operations as 
suggested by McNutt (1998).  Therefore, for the time period of 1980 to 2002, the 
identified major contingencies (where the war dummy variable is coded as “1”) were 








The OSD Comptroller provides estimates of future inflation rates that the cost 
estimators incorporate into their estimates for major defense programs.  These estimates 
of future inflation rates are presented in Chapter 5 of the National Defense Budget 
Estimates section included in the annual President’s Budget submission.  This research 
measures unexpected inflation as the difference between actual inflation and expected 
inflation for the year the funding was used (Smirnoff, 2006:31).  The following formula 
is used to calculate the values for unexpected inflation: 
 
  (2) actual estimatedUnexpected Inflation = Inflation  - Inflation
 
For example, the expected inflation rate for the DoD in 1980 was 5.9 percent, but the 
actual inflation rate for 1980 was 11.7 percent.  As a result, there was 5.8 percent of 
unexpected inflation for 1980.  This level of unexpected inflation was calculated for each 
year from 1980-2002 to correspond with the span of the schedule growth data.  A visual 
representation and a table of the calculated unexpected inflation values are included in 
Appendix B.  
Analysis 
The influence of the major defense acquisition reforms and the external factors 
(budget instability, contingency operations and requirements, and unexpected inflation) 
on schedule growth is empirically evaluated using panel regression.  Panel regression is 
utilized to analyze an independent variable across groups with respect to multiple time 
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periods.  In terms of this research, the groups represent each service and the time periods 
correspond to the years 1980-2002.  
Panel (data) analysis provides several benefits when compared to other possible 
analytical methods, such as multivariate regression analysis of cross-sectional data.  
Panel regression provides the ability to control for omitted variables.  The bias resulting 
from omitted variables is typically an issue with multivariate analysis. This issue stems 
from unknown variable or variables affecting the dependent variable, which leads to 
biased estimations (regression results) (Kennedy, 2003:302).  The issue of omitted 
variables represented the principle limitation in the previous studies of acquisition 
reforms and cost growth (Christensen et al., 1999; Holbrook, 2003).  The ability of panel 
regression to control for these omitted variables is a key benefit to this analytical method.  
In addition, the combining of cross-sectional and time-series data creates more 
observations for statistical testing and produces more variability, which makes the panel 
model more robust to multicollinearity (Kennedy, 2003:302).   
This research utilizes a fixed-effects specification for the panel model consistent 
with that utilized by Smirnoff (2006).  Fixed-effects panel regression assumes there are 
nominal time-series impacts on the dependent variable, but more cross-sectional effects 
(Armstrong, 2006:34).  Smirnoff’s study similarly evaluated the impact of acquisition 
reforms and additional (economic) variables on major defense acquisition programs using 




This research empirically evaluates the influence of defense acquisition reforms 
and external factors (budget instability, contingency operations, and unexpected inflation) 
on schedule growth of major defense acquisition programs between 1980 and 2002.  This 
chapter described the how the dependent variable (schedule growth percentage) and 
independent variables were operationalized and measured, including the corresponding 
rationale.  In addition, a description of the key source of information pertaining to the 
major defense acquisition programs, the Defense Acquisition Executive Summary 
(DAES) reports, was presented.  Finally, this chapter described the analytical method that 
was utilized to analyze the relationship between the independent variables and schedule 
























IV. Analysis and Results 
Chapter Overview 
This chapter presents the analysis performed in order to address the purpose of 
this research.  The first section includes details regarding the theoretical models utilized 
to analyze the collected data.  Following that section, the results of these empirical 
models are presented, including a discussion of the key findings.  This discussion 
includes addressing the findings that yielded results contrary to the expected (based on 
previous research) and the variables that were more significant (statistically and in the 
magnitude of the coefficients) than the other variables.   
Theoretical Model 
 The existing research suggests the below theoretical model for evaluating the 
relationship of the previously discussed factors on schedule growth: 
  (3)   
Budget Stability, Unexpected Inflation, 






The data concerning these variables were collected and coded according the methods 
described in the previous chapter.  As mentioned previously, a cross-sectional fixed-
effects panel model was utilized for this analysis.  The general form of this panel model, 
where i represents the service and t represents the year, is:9   
                                                 
9 An alternate model specification included the percent change in the budget variables.  This specification, 
however, created challenges in the interpretations of the findings, specifically in the applications of the 
coefficients to real-world examples.  As a result, the actual budgetary figures were utilized.  In addition, the 
total budget for each service was excluded due to its high correlation with both the development and 
procurement budgets, which are the primary sources of funding for major acquisition programs. 
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This panel model includes the aforementioned cross-sectional fixed-effects to 
account for the service specific characteristics in the sample data. In addition, several 
other considerations were addressed in the modeling process.  In order to minimize the 
possibility for spurious correlations, the dependent variable (percent schedule growth) 
was tested for stationarity using the augmented Dickey-Fuller test for each panel 
(service).  The results of these tests (in Appendix C) suggest the existence of a stationary 
process.10   
Another consideration tested for in the panel models was autocorrelation, which 
can bias the regression results.  Specifically, it can lead to an upward bias in the estimates 
of the statistical significance of coefficient estimates (Schmidt, 2003:223).  In order to 
address this issue, a first-order autocorrelation component was included in the empirical 
models.11   
An additional concern for the models was heteroskedasticity (non-constant 
variance in the residuals), which can also bias the standard errors of the parameter 
estimates (Schmidt, 2003:247).  In order to mitigate the potential heteroskedasticity, the 
residuals were ‘White-washed’ using White’s heteroskedasticity-consistent variance-
covariance matrix (White, 1980) to obtain robust standard errors.   
                                                 
10 Additional tests of stationarity corroborated these results, specifically the Levin, Lin and Chu test for a 
common unit root.   
11 The Durbin-Watson statistic test was utilized to test for autocorrelation.  In all of the models, the Durbin-
Watson statistic increased such that the value was closer to two (the mean value for the Durbin-Watson statistic).  
As a result, the inclusion of an AR(1) component decreased the uncertainty that autocorrelation is not present.   
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Panel Model Results 
 This section presents and interprets the model results, including a discussion of 
differences between the anticipated and realized impacts (specifically, the direction) of 
each variable.  Two models were developed to determine the impact of the acquisition 
reform efforts and the external variables on schedule growth—one for schedule growth of 
development programs and one for schedule growth of production programs.   
Model 1:  Schedule Growth of Development Contracts 
As mentioned in Chapter II, most of the research concerning schedule growth 
addresses the growth in the development phase of the acquisition process.  The dependent 
variable in this model is the average annual schedule variance (in percentage terms) per 
service for the development programs in the DAES database from 1980 to 2002.  This 
variable is depicted in Figure 1 below.  The schedule growth values for the Navy have 
two distinct peaks in the mid-1980s and the early-1990s.  Both the Army and the Air 


















































Schedule Growth of Development Contracts
 
Figure 1:  Schedule Growth of Development Contracts (1980-2002)  
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R&D Budget (CY06 $B) 0.160 0.677
Proc. Budget (CY06 $B) 0.094 † 1.652
Unexpected Inflation 0.413 *** 2.794
Packard 0.393 0.453
90s Reforms -0.370 -0.310
2000 Revision -1.048 † -1.398
War 1.074 † 1.418
AR(1) 0.537 *** 4.359
F-statistic 12.118 ***
Number of Obs 66




 ***statistical significance at 0.01 level, 
  ** 0.05 level, * 0.10 level, † 0.20 level
Development Schedule Growth Panel Model
Coefficient
 
The results of the panel model are presented in Table 2 above.12  The first 
variables of interest concern the research and development and procurement budgets.  
Changes in the research and development budget do not have a statistically significant 
relationship with the schedule variances (used to measure schedule growth) of the 
development contracts.  On the other hand, procurement budgets have a positive, 
statistically significant relationship with schedule growth of development contracts.  The 
magnitude of this relationship (as measured by the coefficient), however, is not very 
                                                 
12  This research first evaluates the contemporaneous conditions by not including any lagged variables; however, 
alternative model specifications including lags were also examined to see the impacts of their inclusion in the 
model.  The optimal lag lengths determined by the lowest the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) were three 
years for the budget variables, Packard, and the 1990s reforms.  The 2000 revision had a one year lag and war 
had no lag.  All of the same variables as in the original specification were statistically significant to at least the 
0.20 level except unexpected inflation became no longer statistically significant.   
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large.  The results suggest a 10 billion dollar (constant year 2006) increase in the 
service’s procurement budget would increase schedule growth by only about one percent.  
This considerable amount of budget growth represents an approximate sixty percent 
increase in the procurement budget for the Army based on the mean for the sample.   
 Unexpected inflation has a positive, highly statistically significant relationship 
with schedule growth of development contracts.  The results state a one percent value for 
unexpected inflation (such as if inflation was estimated to be 2.5 percent but actually was 
3.5 percent) would increase schedule growth of development contracts by four-tenths of a 
percent, holding all other variables constant.   
 Two of the four binary (dummy) variables have a statistically significant 
relationship with schedule growth in this specified model, including major contingency 
operations (war) and the 2000 revision of the DoD 5000 series of regulation concerning 
the DoD acquisition process.  The results indicate major contingency operations (and the 
corresponding large deployments and budget impacts) increase schedule growth on 
development contracts by a little over one percent.  In addition, the 2000 revision resulted 
in an approximate one percent reduction in schedule growth.  Both of these variables 
agree with the theorized impacts based on the existing research.  On the other hand, the 
other two variables representing the presence of the reform efforts did not have 
statistically significant relationships.13    
                                                 
13 An alternate model specification utilizing percent change in the budget variables did yield a slightly 
statistically significant (to the 0.20 level) for both the 90’s reforms and war.  War has roughly the same 
coefficient as in the original specification (1.16) and the 90’s reforms has a fairly large negative coefficient 
of -2.05 (see Appendix E for results).  However, the budget variables and unexpected inflation were no 
longer significant to even the 0.20 level and the overall model lost explanatory power.   
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The evaluation of schedule variances in dollar terms is not as useful as the 
evaluation of cost variances (used often in cost overrun/growth research).  That is, it does 
not necessarily imply an impact to the overall program schedule (in terms of completion 
dates and changes in program length/duration) of the same magnitude as the calculated 
schedule variance.14   
Model 2:  Schedule Growth of Production Contracts 
The dependent variable in this model is the average annual schedule variance (in 
percentage terms) per service for the production programs in the DAES database from 





















































Schedule Growth of Production Contracts
 
Figure 2:  Schedule Growth of Production Contracts (1980-2002) 
                                                 
14 The one instance it does is if the schedule variance refers only to the efforts on the program’s critical 
path.  The actual impact to the program’s schedule may be either more or less than calculated percentage 
schedule growth depending on what planned efforts of the program had yet to be completed.   
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The values appear to vary more for the production contracts than the development 
contracts, especially for the Army.  This fluctuation is primarily the result of the low 
number of production contract entries for the Army in the DAES database (an average of 
34 per year versus 94 for the Air Force and 125 for the Navy).15   
 The results of the panel model are presented in Table 3 below.  Unlike the model 
for development schedule growth, none of the budget variables have a statistically 
significant relationship with production schedule growth.  Conversely, unexpected 
inflation remains statistically significant in the procurement contracts model with a 
greater magnitude positive relationship with schedule growth than in the development 
 





C 4.386 * 1.680
R&D Budget (CY06 $B) -0.079 -0.393
Proc. Budget (CY06 $B) 0.023 0.423
Unexpected Inflation 0.783 * 1.807
Packard -0.468 -0.394
90s Reforms -1.207 -0.811
2000 Revision -1.020 † -1.327
War 0.726 1.028
AR(1) 0.475 *** 2.890
F-statistic 8.348 ***
Number of Obs 64




 ***statistical significance at 0.01 level, 
  ** 0.05 level, * 0.10 level, † 0.20 level
Procurement Schedule Growth Panel Model
Coefficient
 
                                                 
15 The lower number of entries for the Army is likely the result of having fewer major acquisition programs 
in production in general and even fewer programs receiving earned value data, which is often not obtained 
on fixed-price production contacts.  
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contracts model.  The results indicate a one percent level of unexpected inflation would 
lead to a 0.78 percent increase in schedule variances on production contracts, holding all 
other variables constant.  
Only one of the four binary (dummy) variables has a statistically significant 
relationship with schedule growth in this specified model, which is the 2000 revision of 
the DoD 5000 series of regulation concerning the DoD acquisition process. 16  The 2000 
revision resulted in a one percent reduction in schedule growth, which agrees with the 
theorized impact based on the existing research.  On the other hand, the other two 
variables representing the presence of the reform efforts did not have statistically 
significant relationships.  In addition, the dummy variable representing the major 
contingency operations (i.e., war) did not have a statistically significant relationship with 
schedule growth of procurement contracts. 
Summary 
 This chapter described the analysis used to evaluate the impact of acquisition reform 
efforts and other, external factors on schedule growth of major defense acquisition programs 
(MDAP).  The panel model was first described in general terms.  Then, the regression results 
of the empirical models were presented and discussed.  The models evaluated schedule 
growth for both development and production contracts of the MDAPs.  The next chapter 
furthers the evaluation of the empirical results and their possible policy implications.   
                                                 
16 An alternate model specification akin to the one described in the development panel model was also 
generated for the production contracts.  The only variables to become statistically significant in this revised 
specification were the war dummy variable and the percent change in the development budget (significant 
to the 0.20 level).  Both unexpected inflation and the 2000 revision dummy variable remained consistent in 
both the magnitude of the coefficient and the level of statistical significance.  
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V. Conclusions and Recommendations 
Chapter Overview 
 This chapter further examines the results from Chapter IV through their 
application to the research objectives identified in the introduction (Chapter I).  That 
section is followed by a discussion of the major findings of this research.  Finally, 
recommendations for future research are presented.  
Research Objectives 
The primary purpose of this research was to perform an empirically rigorous 
study of the impacts of acquisition reform efforts and other, external factors on 
acquisition schedule growth that was lacking in the existing literature.  Entries from the 
DAES database representing both development and production contracts for all three 
services from 1980 to 2002 were utilized to build an empirical (panel) model in order to 
evaluate the effectiveness of acquisition reform efforts on limiting schedule growth in the 
development of major DoD weapon systems.  In order to isolate the influences of the 
reforms, this research addressed the extent to which factors external to the acquisition 
process are related to schedule growth, specifically defense budget changes (budget 
instability), unexpected inflation, and contingency operations.  
Discussion of Results and Research Objectives 
 This section applies the results from Chapter IV to the research objectives, 
including a discussion of potential conclusions concerning the objectives based on the 
results of the empirical models.  The combined results of both panel models—the 
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development contracts model and the production contracts model—are shown in Table 4 
below.   
Table 4:  Results of the Panel Models 
Variable t-Statistic Variable t-Statistic
C -1.039 -0.962 C 4.386 * 1.680
R&D Budget (CY06 $B) 0.160 0.677 R&D Budget (CY06 $B) -0.079 -0.393
Proc. Budget (CY06 $B) 0.094 † 1.652 Proc. Budget (CY06 $B) 0.023 0.423
Unexpected Inflation 0.413 *** 2.794 Unexpected Inflation 0.783 * 1.807
Packard 0.393 0.453 Packard -0.468 -0.394
90s Reforms -0.370 -0.310 90s Reforms -1.207 -0.811
2000 Revision -1.048 † -1.398 2000 Revision -1.020 † -1.327
War 1.074 † 1.418 War 0.726 1.028
AR(1) 0.537 *** 4.359 AR(1) 0.475 *** 2.890
 ***statistical significance at 0.01 level, ** 0.05 level, * 0.10 level, † 0.20 level





 This research did not obtain results consistent with the previous research that 
suggests reduction in budgets (a proxy for budget instability) would lead to a schedule 
slip (and therefore, schedule growth) (McNutt, 1998:276).  McNutt’s study addressed 
schedule impacts of development programs identified through the use of a survey 
instrument (vice contractual data) and the budget stability referred to the program’s 
development budget.  In addition, his research examined programs of varying sizes and 
not just the major weapon systems (as in this research).  This research did not find that 
changes in a service’s research and development budget impacts schedule growth of 
either procurement or development contracts.  This lack of a relationship is perhaps the 
result of major defense development programs tending not to have their development  
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budgets dramatically reduced unless the program is terminated.17    
Changes in the procurement budget, however, do appear to have a statistical 
relationship with schedule growth for development programs.  While the literature does 
not address procurement budget stability as a source of development schedule growth, a 
possible explanation may that increased production budgets likely correspond to larger 
acquisition programs (including development) that are more complex (and likely more 
costly).  These larger, more complex development programs are more likely to 
experience schedule growth (Rodrigues, 2000:10).  While the changes in the procurement 
budget may capture this potential relationship with schedule growth, a more appropriate 
measure that is not included in the empirical model that may explain this relationship is 
technical complexity (or technical maturity). 
 
Unexpected Inflation  
While Smirnoff (2006) did not find a statistical relationship between unexpected 
inflation and cost overruns, the postulated rationale was that the lack of a relationship 
may be due to tradeoffs of reduced performance requirements or extended schedules.  
Based on the results of the empirical result, the latter appears to be the case.  This 
research found that unexpected inflation impacts schedule growth in both development 
and production contracts.  That is, when faced with a level of inflation greater than the 
forecasted amount (a positive value for unexpected inflation), both development and  
                                                 
17 The same cannot be said regarding production budget profiles, which are often significantly larger than 
the development budgets and change more dramatically as a result of reduced quantities to procure and/or 
due to other (often political) factors.   
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production programs experience increased schedule growth.  For example, one percent 
level of unexpected inflation would result in a 0.4 percent increase in schedule growth for 
development contracts and 0.8 percent increase for procurement contracts, holding all 
other variables constant.  This increase in schedule growth signifies an increase in work 
that was not accomplished as planned.  This level of schedule variance in the contracts 
likely corresponds to an extension in the program’s schedules (such as, completion and 
milestone dates) to perform the missed work.   
 
Contingency Operations (War) 
 The existing research presents conflicting theories on the potential impact of 
major contingency operations on schedule growth.  One side suggests contingency 
operations require systems to be fielded sooner, especially those in or near production, so 
that the capability is available to the war fighting personnel (McNutt, 1998:40).  The 
other side suggests contingency operations drive funding needs that contribute to budget 
instability in the programs not identified as contingency requirements (Czelusniak and 
Rogers, 1997:59).  While the war dummy variable was not statistically significant in the 
procurement contracts model, it was significant in the development contracts model.  In 
this model, the existence of a major contingency operation increased schedule growth on 
development contracts by a little over one percent.  Therefore, the results of the 
production model agree with the theory presented in Czelusniak and Rogers (1997) that 
the budget instability generated by contingency operations leads to worsened program 
performance in terms of schedule growth.  In addition, while a handful of programs may 
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be fielded sooner than expected in order to support contingency operations, the majority 
of programs are not.18  
 
Acquisition Reform Efforts 
 After accounting for the impacts of changes in the defense budget, unexpected 
inflation, and contingency operations on schedule growth, the results were primarily 
inconclusive regarding the impact of the acquisition reforms efforts on schedule growth.  
The existing research suggests the reforms utilized in the empirical model had the 
greatest potential to impact schedule execution.  These acquisition reforms include the 
Packard Commission (1986), the National Performance Review (1993) and Federal 
Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994, and the revision of the DoD 5000 series in 2000.    
 This research did not find a statistical relationship between the implementation of 
the Packard Commission’s recommendations and initiatives and schedule growth of 
either production or development contracts.  Similar inconclusive results were obtained 
regarding the implementation of the 1990s reform efforts in the 1996 revision of the DoD 
5000 series.  The 2000 revision of the DoD 5000 series, which included several initiatives 
aimed at controlling cost and schedule (specifically, evolutionary acquisition), has a 
                                                 
18 This assertion is made based on a visual examination of the schedule milestones contained in the 
Selected Acquisition Reports (SARs) of the major defense acquisition programs from 1997 to 2005.  
Programs that require quicker fielding tend to have this reduced duration from the initiation of the program.  
As a result, the corresponding reports would not indicate a reduction in schedule, because the reduced 
schedule is the baseline for that program.  For example, the schedule for the Army’s Stryker program is 
perceived to have been advanced due to contingency requirements.  The first SAR reflecting the approved 
program based on the Milestone II Review (in Nov 2000) already has a combined development/production 
(low rate initial production) decision with a threshold date of January 2003 for the first unit equipped.  The 
actual first unit equipped date was actually later in March 2003.  If the program had been advanced, it 
would be expected that this date would be sooner than initially planned and definitely before the threshold 
date.  This, however, is not the case.   
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statistically significant relationship with schedule growth of both development and 
procurement contracts.  Furthermore, this research found the 2000 revision reduced 
development schedule growth by 1.05 percent and procurement schedule growth by 1.02 
percent.  This result agrees with the research suggesting the potential benefits of some of 
the initiatives implemented in the 2000 revision, particularly evolutionary acquisition, 
which places greater emphasis on controlling requirements and fielding more mature 
technologies versus lengthy developments involving new and/or unproven technologies 
(GAO, 2006:1). 
 The lack of a relationship with schedule growth for the bulk of the reform efforts 
likely indicates these reforms were not effective at limiting scheduling growth; however, 
they also did not result in increased schedule growth.  This inefficiency at limiting 
schedule growth may be due to the shortfalls in the policies enacted as part of these 
reforms, but more likely are from not fully implementing the recommendations and 
initiatives into the DoD acquisition processes.  McNutt contended that, despite 
implementation by the DoD, the recommendations of the Packard Commission on 
schedule execution were not widely internalized and appeared to have been unsuccessful 
(1998:50).  The results imply that this might have been the case not only for the Packard 
recommendations but also for subsequent reform efforts.  
Significance of Research 
 This study fills the void in the existing literature of an empirically rigorous study 
of the factors contributing to schedule growth.  In particular, several studies have 
examined the impacts of reform efforts/initiatives on cost overruns (Christensen et al., 
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1998; Holbrook, 2003; Smirnoff, 2006), but none have yet to study the impacts on 
schedule growth.  Similar deficiencies exist in the literature concerning the impact of  
unexpected inflation and contingency operations (war) on schedule growth.  As a result, 
this research can form the basis for future research involving empirical analyses of the 
schedule execution of defense weapon system programs.   
Recommendations for Future Research/Policy Considerations 
 Based on the results of this research, this section presents a few policy 
considerations concerning schedule growth of major defense acquisition programs.  The 
first policy consideration is for greater resources to be devoted to forecasting inflation, 
considering its significant impact on schedule growth in both development and 
procurement efforts.  The second policy consideration concerns accounting for the effects 
of contingency operations (war) on development schedule growth in the costs for future 
contingency operations.  These costs may be calculated using the cost-of-delay analysis 
method in McNutt (1998) that considers the additional operations and sustainment costs 
for the additional time the system to be replaced has to remain in service and multiplier 
(or efficiency) costs/savings that are lost due to the delay in the fielding of a weapon 
system/capability.  The final consideration is to place greater emphasis on the 
implementation of the recommendations and initiatives set forth in the acquisition 
reforms.  A 2006 GAO study supported this assessment, pointing to the issue of the DoD 
allowing programs to enter into system development with immature technologies as a 




 Recommendations for future research follow two general paths: performing a 
similar analysis using a different dataset and examining different factors to see their 
impact on schedule growth.  Future research concerning the first group includes utilizing 
the same method on individual program data using either earned value data (as per this 
study) in the DAES reports or using schedule milestones found in the Selected 
Acquisition Reports (SARs).  This type of analysis allows for greater evaluation of 
schedule impacts based on type of weapon system and other programmatic 
characteristics.  In addition, the existing dataset can be expanded to more recent years to 
discern any changes in the results while allowing for an analysis of more recent 
phenomena, such as changes in the organizational structure of Air Force program offices 
(System Wings, Program Executive Officer consolidation/movement).   
 Additionally, other studies can utilize a similar method to evaluate the impact of 
other factors on schedule execution.  The other factors could include personnel 
characteristics, including education level, acquisition training, and the number in a given 
job (e.g., cost analysis).  Another possible study concerns the evaluation of the common 
assumption that schedule growth leads to cost growth or vice versa.  Finally, a study 
could be performed comparing the earned value data in the DAES to that of the schedule 
milestone data (in month/year form) found in the schedule section in either the DAES or 
SAR reports.  This study will analyze to what extent changes in the earned value data are 







Appendix A:  Summary of DAES Data 
Example Entries 
Table 5 below provides an example of a few entries in the DAES database.  The 
specific areas utilized in this research were the year, budgeted cost for work performed 
(BCWP), and budgeted cost for work scheduled (BCWS).  The sample entries reflect the 
DAES entries corresponding to the May 25, 2002, DAES submissions for those 
programs.   
Table 5:  DAES – Sample Entries 
SUBMITDATE Contract ID Service Program Name ACWP BCWP BCWS BAC
Program 
Phase
5/25/2002 F0862698C0027 Air Force AMRAAM (AIM-120A) 135.2 128.9 130.2 179.8 Development
5/25/2002 DAAH0199C0121 Army ATACMS BLK II 130.4 115.6 123.7 124.6 Production
5/25/2002 DAAH0199C0154 Army ATACMS BLK II 122.1 102 106.3 132 Development
5/25/2002 N0001997C0069 Navy
Cooperative Engagement 
Capability (CEC) 93.3 95.7 96.1 107.9 Development
5/25/2002 N0002499C5110 Navy
Cooperative Engagement 
Capability (CEC) 131.1 132.2 132.8 149.9 Development
5/25/2002 N39997993754 Navy DD(X) Destroyer 140 137.4 141.5 172.4 Development
5/25/2002 N0002496C2304 Navy DDG 51 935.8 850.5 858.1 926.7 Production
5/25/2002 N0002496C2305 Navy DDG 51 1067.7 968.3 979.6 1021.1 Production
5/25/2002 N0002497C5178 Navy DDG 51 432.8 448 452.1 772.2 Production
5/25/2002 N0002498C2306 Navy DDG 51 831.2 747.7 780.6 1849.7 Production
5/25/2002 N0002498C2307 Navy DDG 51 865.9 851 912.4 2599.7 Production
5/25/2002 F0470197C0044 Air Force GBS 186.2 186.8 187.3 187.9 Development
5/25/2002 F3365701C4600 Air Force
Global Hawk Unmanned 
aerial Vehicle 7.9 8 8.2 83.7 Development
5/25/2002 F3365701C4601 Air Force
Global Hawk Unmanned 
aerial Vehicle 3.5 3.5 3.4 90.3 Production
5/25/2002 DAAH0198C0033 Army GMLRS Upgrade Missile 125.2 122.9 124.9 135.6 Development
5/25/2002 F0863500C0101 Air Force JDAM 27.4 29.5 29.9 0 Development
5/25/2002 F0862696C0002 Air Force
Joint air to surface Standoff 
Missile (JASSM) 312.5 295.8 299.6 334.3 Development
5/25/2002 N0001995C0120 Navy
Joint standoff weapon 
(JSOW) 198.2 190.6 191.5 203.2 Development
5/25/2002 F1962800C0023 Air Force JSTARS 108.5 123.1 122.2 207.3 Production
5/25/2002 F1962897C0001 Air Force JSTARS 293.7 336.8 337.4 358.1 Production
5/25/2002 F1962898C0003 Air Force JSTARS 143.7 168.9 169.3 202.3 Production
5/25/2002 F0470100C0006 Air Force
Navistar Global Positioning 
system (GPS) II Modern 50.5 49.8 49.5 51.2 Development
5/25/2002 F0470196C0025 Air Force
Navistar Global Positioning 
system (GPS) II Modern 152 144 154 443 Development
5/25/2002 N0002496C5337 Navy SM 2 (BLKS I-IV) 80.4 78 78.4 82.1 Production










 The following tables list the major defense acquisition programs comprising the 
dataset analyzed in this research.19  Table 6 lists the Army programs and the number of 
contract entries in the overall DAES data.  Table 7 lists the Air Force programs.  Table 8 
lists the Navy programs.   




ABRAMS Tank M1/M1A1 11 35
ADDS 27 41
Advanced Threat Infrared Countermeasures 25 0
AFATDS (ATCCS) 49 0
AH-64 Apache 25 97
Army TACMS 65 0
ASAS (ATCCS) Block IIB III 32 17
ATACMS BLK II 94 10
BFVS A3 Upgrade 29 0
BFVS M2 M3 (Bradley Fighting Vehicle 4 47
CH-47 Improved Cargo Helicopter (CH-47F) 13 0
CH-47D Chinook 1 0
Comanche Reconnaissance Attack Helicopter (RAH-66) 37 0
COPPERHEAD 0 5
CSSCS 0 21
FAAD C2I 61 0
FAAD NLOS Fiber Optic Guided-Missile 7 0
FBCB2 0 3
GMLRS Upgrade Missile 13 0
IAV (Stryker) 6 0
Javelin 30 24
JSTARS Common Ground Station (CGS) 26 0
Laser Hellfire 28 58
Longbow Apache FCR 73 0
Longbow Hellfire 0 21
M1A2 Abrams Upgrade 10 0




Patriot PAC-3 91 9
PERSHING II 21 69
ROLAND 0 20
RPV (AQUILA) 68 0
SADARM 71 16
SCAMP 10 0
SGT YORK GUN (DIVAD) 0 31
SINCGARS 36 0
STINGER 29 56
STINGER RMP 0 56
TACIT RAINBOW (JGL) 3 0
TOW 2 19 0
UH-60A/L Black Hawk 0 32
Number of Contract Entries
 
                                                 
19 As mentioned in Chapter III, the earned value data detailed in the DAES entries for these programs were 
accumulated for the year and added with the other programs for that service in that specific year.   
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AMRAAM (AIM-120A) 92 83
ASAT 66 10
ATS 20 0
B-1 CMUP-DSUP 2 0
B-1B 110 255
B-1B CMUP 58 0
B-2A 5 10




DSCS III A&B 21 15
DSP 87 207









Global Hawk Unmanned aerial Vehicle 1 1
Inertial Upper Stage 0 14
IR Maverick 9 34
I-S/A AMPE 13 0
JDAM 30 0
JGL Tacit Rainbow 27 0
Joint air to surface Standoff Missile (JASSM) 16 0
Joint Primary training aircraft (JPATS) (T-45) 24 64
Joint Tactical Information Distribution System 25 0
JSIPS CIGSS 9 0
JSTARS 79 102
KC-135R 0 42
MARK XV IFF 33 0
MILSTAR 32 17
Minuteman III Guidance replacement Program (MMIII 38 21
Minuteman III Propulsion replacement program (MMII 22 31
Navistar Global Positioning system (GPS) II Modern 84 98
OTH-B (Radar) 0 52
Peacekeeper 198 494
PLSS 17 0
Rail Garrison 48 0
Sensor Fused Weapon 28 50
Small ICBM 234 0
SMART-T 20 0
Space based infra red surveillance system (SBIRS) 25 0
SRAM T AGM 131A/B 17 0
T-46A 24 10
Titan IV 11 18










5-INCH GUIDED PROJECTILE 9 0
A-12 9 0




AN-APG-79 Active Electronically Scanned Array Radar 2 0
AOE 6 0 73
ASPJ (AN/ALQ-165) 0 33
AV-8B Harrier II 10 7
C/MH-53E 7 0
CG 47 Aegis Cruiser 0 153
Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) 39 14
CVN 68 0 66
DD(X) Destroyer 3 0
DDG 51 28 433
E-2C Computer Upgrade 63 0
EMSP 12 0
F/A-18 C/D 21 37




HARM (NAVY) 27 5
Joint standoff weapon (JSOW) 52 9
JTIDS (NAVY) 15 0




LSD 41 CARGO VAR 0 26
LSD 41 Class CV 0 24
MCM 1 0 31
MH-60R 62 6
MH-60S 9 0
MHC 51 0 112
MIDS-LVT 43 0
MK 48 ADCAP 0 46
MK 50 Torpedo 38 33
NATO PHM 1 11
Navy Area TMBD 66 4
NSSN New Attack Sub 63 104
P-7A 6 0
PHALANX CIWS (MK-15) 0 6
Phoenix (AIM-54C) 0 16
ROTHR 3 0
SEA LANCE 26 0
SEALIFT 0 123
SIDEWINDER (AIM-9L) (Navy) 2 0
SIDEWINDER (AIM-9M) (Navy) 1 0
SM 2 (BLKS I-IV) 29 69
SPARROW (AIM-7M) (Navy) 0 14
SSN 688 Attack Sub 35 203
T-45TS 16 5
TACTAS 1 1
Tactical Tomahawk Missile 14 0
T-AGOS 0 20
T-AO 187 OILER 0 26
Tomahawk R/UGM-109 65 114
TRIDENT II MSL 79 187
TRIDENT II SUB 0 154
TRIDENT SUB 0 19
USMC H-1 Upgrades 17 0
V-22 Joint services advanced vertical lift aircraft 117 88
Virginia Class Sub SSN 774 0 84





Appendix B:  Summary of Independent Variables and Summary Statistics 
Procurement and Development Budgets 
Figures 3 and 4 below show the procurement and development budgets for the Army, 
Air Force, and Navy between 1980 and 2002.  These budget figures reflect the Total 
Obligation Authority values detailed in Chapter 6 of the National Defense Budget Estimates 
for 2006 (also known as the FY2006 Greenbook).  The values presented throughout this study 


















































































































Figure 4:  Research & Development Budgets from 1980-2002 (CY06 $B) 
Unexpected Inflation 
The estimates of future inflation rates are presented in Chapter 5 of the National 
Defense Budget Estimates section included in the annual President’s Budget submission.  
Figure 5 depicts the levels of expected inflation and actual inflation for each year from 1980 










































Inflation (DoD)  
Figure 5:  Expected and Actual Inflation Rates from 1980-2002 
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1980 5.9% 11.7% 5.8%
1981 8.1% 10.4% 2.3%
1982 8.9% 7.5% -1.4%
1983 6.3% 3.6% -2.7%
1984 3.7% 3.0% -0.7%
1985 4.5% 3.3% -1.2%
1986 4.0% 2.6% -1.4%
1987 3.4% 2.9% -0.5%
1988 4.5% 3.6% -0.9%
1989 3.4% 3.9% 0.5%
1990 3.0% 3.0% 0.0%
1991 4.0% 4.6% 0.6%
1992 2.9% 1.9% -1.0%
1993 3.7% 2.9% -0.8%
1994 2.0% 2.3% 0.3%
1995 2.2% 2.0% -0.2%
1996 2.8% 2.2% -0.6%
1997 2.6% 2.2% -0.4%
1998 2.2% 2.3% 0.1%
1999 2.0% 2.2% 0.2%
2000 2.2% 2.5% 0.3%
2001 2.8% 3.0% 0.2%
2002 3.0% 2.7% -0.3%  
 
Summary Statistics 
 Table 10 below provides the summary statistics for the continuous variables 
utilized in this research.  The values reflect the entire range of data from 1980 to 2002 for 
all three services.  The amount of schedule growth appears to vary more in procurement 
contracts, including values reflecting periods where the programs of one service were 
ahead of schedule on average for that year (that is, a negative schedule growth value).   
Table 10:  Summary Statistics 
Obs. Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev.
R&D Schedule Growth (percent) 69 3.25 2.91 9.84 0.47 2.20
Proc. Schedule Growth (percent) 68 3.76 2.60 17.94 -2.01 3.86
R&D Budget ($ billion) 69 11.70 10.35 22.61 5.89 4.60
Procurement Budget ($ billion) 69 28.09 25.64 61.31 7.90 14.06
Unexpected Inflation (percent) 69 -0.08 -0.30 5.80 -2.70 1.57  
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Appendix C:  Tests for Stationarity of Dependent Variable 
 
 In order to minimize the possibilities for spurious correlations, the dependent 
variable used in the panel regression model must be stationary.  In this research, the 
dependent variables are the schedule growth percentages of procurement and 
development contracts in the DAES database for each service in each year.  The 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test was utilized in this study to test for the presence of a unit 
root; the values are Tables 11 and 12 below.  All of the p-values for the tests are less than 
α=0.05, except for that of the Air Force’s research and development contracts, which has 
a p-value less than α=0.15.  This value might have impacted some of the findings in this 
research; however, the value is still relatively low and the other two services had lower 
(more ideal) p-values.  This is confirmed in the Levin, Lin and Chu test for common unit 
root test (values in Table 13) with both the procurement and development contract entries 
having p-values less than α=0.05.  As a result, the null hypothesis (of a unit root) can be 
rejected and it can be concluded that the schedule growth data reflect a stationary 
process.   
Table 11:  Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Results for Development Contracts 











Z(t)-Air Force 22 -1.076 -2.528 -1.725 -1.325
p-value for Z(t) = 0.1474
Z(t)-Army 22 -2.877 -2.528 -1.725 -1.325
p-value for Z(t) = 0.0047
Z(t)-Navy 22 -1.81 -2.528 -1.725 -1.325
p-value for Z(t) = 0.0427





Table 12:  Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Results for Procurement Contracts 











Z(t)-Air Force 22 -2.233 -2.528 -1.725 -1.325
p-value for Z(t) = 0.0186
Z(t)-Army 20 -3.147 -2.552 -1.734 -1.33
p-value for Z(t) = 0.0028
Z(t)-Navy 22 -2.482 -2.528 -1.725 -1.325
p-value for Z(t) = 0.011
Z(t) has t-distribution
Percent Schedule Growth - Procurement Contracts
 
 




R&D Contracts 64 -1.68588 0.0459
Proc. Contracts 58 -3.44782 0.0003
























Appendix D:  Tests for Stationarity of Continuous Independent Variables 
 
 In addition to testing for stationarity of the dependent variable, unit root tests (same 
as in Appendix C) were also performed on the continuous independent variables (budgets and 
unexpected inflation) utilized in this research.  The results of the individual Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller Tests are provided in Tables 14-16.  Unexpected inflation has very significant 
test statistics for both the individual and common unit root tests, indicating a stationary 
process.  In addition, the research and development budgets appear to reflect a stationary 
process (p-values less that α=0.10 for the individual unit root tests and around α=0.10 for the 
common unit root test).  The procurement budgets appear to have a greater possibility for a 
non-stationary process with p-values around α=0.20.  The transformation of the budgets into 
percentage change from previous year seems to correct any issues with non-stationarity in 
both the procurement and development budgets.  That is, the p-values for both the individual 
and common unit root tests are less than α=0.01.  The results of these tests for the 
transformed budget variables are provided in Tables 18-20.  In accordance with this 
adjustment, regression results utilizing these transformed budget variables are provided in 
Appendix E. 
Table 14:  Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Results for Development Budgets 











Z(t)-Air Force 22 -2.371 -2.528 -1.725 -1.325
p-value for Z(t) = 0.0139
Z(t)-Army 22 -1.651 -2.528 -1.725 -1.325
p-value for Z(t) = 0.0572
Z(t)-Navy 22 -1.497 -2.528 -1.725 -1.325
p-value for Z(t) = 0.075






Table 15:  Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Results for Procurement Budgets 











Z(t)-Air Force 22 -0.817 -2.528 -1.725 -1.325
p-value for Z(t) = 0.2119
Z(t)-Army 22 -0.754 -2.528 -1.725 -1.325
p-value for Z(t) = 0.2299
Z(t)-Navy 22 -0.804 -2.528 -1.725 -1.325
p-value for Z(t) = 0.2153




Table 16:  Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Results for Unexpected Inflation 











Z(t)-Air Force 22 -6.01 -2.528 -1.725 -1.325
p-value for Z(t) = 0
Z(t)-Army 22 -6.01 -2.528 -1.725 -1.325
p-value for Z(t) = 0
Z(t)-Navy 22 -6.01 -2.528 -1.725 -1.325











Development Budget (CY06 $B)
Procurement Budget (CY06 $B)
Unexpected Inflation (%)










Table 18:  Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Results for Percent Change of 
Development Budgets 











Z(t)-Air Force 22 -2.664 -2.528 -1.725 -1.325
p-value for Z(t) = 0.0075
Z(t)-Army 22 -3.277 -2.528 -1.725 -1.325
p-value for Z(t) = 0.0019
Z(t)-Navy 22 -3.059 -2.528 -1.725 -1.325
p-value for Z(t) = 0.0031




Table 19:  Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Results for Percent Change of 
Procurement Budgets 











Z(t)-Air Force 22 -2.589 -2.528 -1.725 -1.325
p-value for Z(t) = 0.0088
Z(t)-Army 22 -2.72 -2.528 -1.725 -1.325
p-value for Z(t) = 0.0066
Z(t)-Navy 22 -3.141 -2.528 -1.725 -1.325
p-value for Z(t) = 0.0026
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Appendix E:  Alternative Specification for Panel Model 
 
 This section provides regression results for the schedule growth panel models 
utilizing a slightly altered specification for the models, which can be found in Table 21.  That 
is, percent change of the budget variables were used in place of the constant year 2006 dollar 
figures utilized previously (in the body of this study).  This altered specification results in 
fewer statistically significant variables in the model for schedule growth of development 
contracts.  In addition, the development model explains less of the variation in the schedule 
growth data (an adjusted r-squared value of 0.568 versus 0.631).  On the other hand, the 
procurement model has more statistically significant variables and the revised model explains 
more of the variation in the schedule growth data (from 0.538 to 0.555).   
 
Table 21:  Alternative Model Specification Regression Results 
Variable t-Statistic t-Statistic
C 4.436 *** 3.353 3.943 *** 4.586
% Change - R&D Budget -4.6E-05 -0.002 0.039 † 1.380
% Change - Proc. Budget 0.0087 0.717 0.022 1.004
Unexpected Inflation 0.269 0.912 0.841 * 1.878
Packard -0.542 -0.453 -0.192 -0.212
90s Reforms -2.049 † -1.549 -1.247 -1.145
2000 Revision -0.777 -1.160 -1.365 † -1.391
War 1.160 † 1.531 0.930 † 1.602
AR(1) 0.631 *** 4.813 0.500 *** 3.222
F-statistic 9.554 *** 8.867 ***
Number of Obs 66 66
Number of Groups 3 3
R-squared 0.635 0.626
Adjusted R-squared 0.568 0.555
Durbin-Watson stat 1.652 2.206
Fixed-Effects Yes Yes
Robust Standard Errors Yes Yes
 ***statistical significance at 0.01 level, ** 0.05 level, * 0.10 level, † 0.20 level
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